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Abstract 
This paper evaluates whether Nigeria is ready to adopt inflation targeting (IT), a monetary policy 
framework that several emerging markets have adopted over the last one decade. The paper reviews 
literature on selected conditions for successful implementation of IT and then focuses on whether one 
specific precondition of an empirically stable monetary transmission mechanism is tenable. Vector 
autoregressive (VAR) model was applied using select monetary policy and other macroeconomic 
variables to explore the various channels using the Granger causality tests, impulse responses, and 
variance decompositions. Results show that inflation in Nigeria is impassive to monetary transmission 
variables in the model. Specifically, weak link between prices and credit and interest rate channels were 
established. However, evidence of strong inverse link between exchange rate and prices was found in the 
model. This suggests exchange rate pass-through on the level of prices in the economy. The paper, 
therefore, recommends the pursuance of IT lite in Nigeria.  
 
Keywords: Inflation targeting, vector autoregressive model, Granger causality test, monetary 
transmission mechanism, exchange rate pass-through. 
 
1.1  Introduction 
Since early 1990’s inflation targeting (IT) has been increasingly viewed as a good monetary 
policy framework and was widely acclaimed by economist and policymakers alike. Because of 
its enormous potentials as an effective instrument of managing inflation, nations that have 
adopted it never turn back. Inflation targeting is a monetary policy regime, which is 
characterized by public announcement of official target ranges or quantitative targets for price 
level increases and by explicit acknowledgement that low inflation is the most crucial long-run 
objective of the monetary authorities. According to Savensson (1999) IT framework sets out very 
clear goals for monetary policy, defines responsibilities, and establishes measures of 
accountability and transparency. It is however, characterized as ‘constrained discretion’ because 
it requires the central bank to not only set out clear targets, but to use appropriate instruments to 
hit the target, Fischer (2000). Loayza and Soto (2002) observe that although the term inflation 
targeting is now commonly used by bankers and scholars, several features of this monetary 
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regime and its effects on economic performance remain elusive. After experiencing moderate, 
but, persistent inflation rates for more than two decades, industrialized economies have 
controlled and maintained inflation at historically low levels in recent years. Evidences have 
shown that Inflation targeting frameworks have often been adopted in even economies without a 
history of stable inflation; this is particularly so for countries of Latin America and Africa who 
were seen as epitome of chronically high inflation. For instance, Chile and Brazil had inflation 
rate of 26 percent and 19 percent, respectively, prior to IT adoption and they have had a success 
story on inflation targeting. 
 
Since the early 1990s, inflation targeting (IT) has become a popular choice of monetary policy 
regime, with more than 20 countries - both developed and emerging market economies that now 
adhere to IT framework. Evidences have shown that countries adopted IT under many different 
circumstances, ranging from a well-planned switch from a different policy regime (New Zealand, 
Canada) to the solution of a currency crisis (United Kingdom). Equally IT has been pursued with 
different vigor and under different sets of institutional arrangements - see Bamidele, 2007; for a 
detailed review of cross country experiences and prerequisites for successful IT in both 
developed and emerging economies. Nonetheless, the prerequisites include but are not limited to: 
independence of the central bank; absence of fiscal dominance, that is, where a Central Bank 
bears minimal burden of financing government deficit; a single, well-defined inflation target; a 
high degree of transparency and accountability of the Central Bank; a good inflation forecasting 
model; sufficiently virile financial markets in terms of both depth and breadth to be able to 
absorb the placement of both public and private debt instruments; etc.  
 
This paper will not assess the merits and demerits of IT as this has been extensively discussed in 
previous studies: See, for example, Debelle (1997), Masson, Savastano, and Sharma (1997), 
Tutar (2002) and Truman (2003). It has, however, been observed by Bakradze and Billmeier 
(2007) that the growing number of countries that target inflation and the perceived success of 
this monetary policy strategy serve as a stimulus for countries that engage in alternative regimes 
- such as monetary or exchange rate targeting - to shift to IT or to consider more seriously, such a 
shift in the near future. Consequently, this consideration raises the question of how to evaluate 
whether a country is ready to join the group of inflation targeters now, later or even never. 
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Considerations for IT framework in Nigeria started since 2000 with the presentation of a position 
paper on the subject in the Bank; Uchendu, 2000. In furtherance to this, the Bank devoted its 
fifteenth annual conference to the theme “Inflation Targeting in Nigeria” in 2006.  Similarly, 
with the enactment of the 2007 Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Act, operational autonomy of the 
CBN was strengthened. The Bank was charged with the responsibility of achieving price stability 
among other functions and the appointment and removal of the CBN Governor is subject to the 
confirmation of the Senate as enshrined in the Act. Uchendu (2007) further noted that the 
launching of the Financial System Strategy (FSS) 2020, added vigor towards implementation of 
IT framework in the country since it hinges on strategic objective of achieving low single digit 
inflation. The Bank on its part decomposed its Research and Statistics Department into a 
department each with a view to strengthen and improve the quality of data and research output 
carried out in different aspects of monetary policy implementation. Recently, modeling unit in 
the Research department is charged with the task of developing a robust model for Nigeria. To 
date, there is sufficiently large body of literature on lessons deduced for Nigeria on IT.   
 
While these positive developments take place, it is imperative to assess, from empirical 
standpoint, whether Nigeria is ready for IT or not. A number of empirical studies have come up 
with different conclusions on the level of preparedness of different countries on adoption of IT 
framework. Weak Central Bank accountability and high financial instability, for instance, were 
the main concern in Chile’s bid to IT according to Mishkin (2000); Central Bank independence 
in South Africa according to Jonsson (1999) and Bakradze and Billmeier (2007) hammered on 
the need for Georgia’s Central Bank to overcome some institutional and operational weaknesses 
before it implements IT.  South Africa is ready for IT according to Woglom (2000) and Poland 
according to Christofferson, Solk and Wescott (2001). Against this background, the main aim of 
this paper is to assess whether Nigeria is ready for the implementation of inflation targeting. It, 
therefore, seeks to estimate the quantitative relationship between inflation, monetary policy 
instruments and output. The paper extends the analysis further by exploring the nature of some 
monetary transmission channels. Empirical data from 1986Q1 to 2006Q4 would be sourced from 
publications of the Central Bank of Nigeria. 
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The main indicators are; Consumer price index, gross domestic product, money supply (M2), 
interest rate, exchange rate, fiscal balance, ratio of credit to money supply, treasury bills rate and 
lending rate  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: following this introduction is literature review and 
theoretical issues in section two. Central Bank independence, transparency and accountability 
and recent developments in monetary policy implementation are reviewed in section three while 
section four presents the research methodology of the paper. Results and discussions come up in 
section five and conclusions and recommendations in section six.   
II. Literature Review and Theoretical Issues 
The need for stable prices in an economy has since been documented in both theoretical and 
empirical literature. This is because of the adverse effect of inflation on the economy – price 
distortion, flourishing of rent-seeking activities, misallocation of scarce resources and social 
unrest. The negative effect of inflation on of economic growth has been explored in many studies 
see, for example, Barro (1995), Bruno and Easterly (1995) and Ghosh and Phillips (1998). 
According to Krueger (2005) inflation distorts resource allocation in the economy. It hurts the 
poorest members of society disproportionately. It creates uncertainty and it arbitrarily 
redistributes income and wealth. It undermines macroeconomic stability and it makes sustained 
rapid growth impossible to achieve. The choice of inflation targeting as instrument of 
macroeconomic management is increasingly gaining grounds since the pioneering example by 
New Zealand and Chile. 
  
To date, over 20 countries, both developed and emerging economies have switched to this 
strategy and their performance is remarkable. According to Loayza and Soto (2002) except for 
two countries that became part of the European Monetary Union (Finland and Spain), no 
inflation-targeting country has ever abandoned the regime. What then exactly is inflation 
targeting? Although definitions differ in detail, there is some consensus on the main 
characteristics of this monetary regime: the existence of an explicit quantitative goal that engages 
the central bank in the primary objective of price stability; the lack of fiscal dominance and the 
absence of competing nominal objectives; and a monetary institution that enjoys instrument 
independence and operates transparently and openly to the public.  
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The following definition by Mishkin (2000) of inflation targeting captures most of the issues 
raised in the literature. 
 
“Inflation targeting is a monetary policy strategy that encompasses five main elements: i) the 
public announcement of medium term numerical target for inflation; ii) an institutional 
commitment to price stability as the primary goal of monetary policy, to which other goals 
are subordinated; iii) an information inclusive strategy in which many variables, and not just 
monetary aggregates or the exchange rate, are used for deciding the setting of policy 
instruments; iv) increased transparency of the monetary policy strategy through 
communication with the public and the markets about the plans, objectives and decisions of 
the monetary authorities; v) increased accountability of the Central Bank for attaining its 
inflation objectives”.  
 
Although in practice no two countries or their central banks implement or have identical IT 
framework, yet a combination of the above elements have characterized the implantation of IT in 
most countries. Some central banks, for example the Reserve Bank of Australia, have a dual 
mandate combining price stability with full employment. In addition, for some central banks, the 
target (or sequence of targets) is a point, and for others it is a range, some define time horizon 
over which the target is to be achieved while some do not, etc., Truman and Janeiro (2002).  
 
In the case of a point target, for instance, the central bank essentially by construction will not hit 
the target every month, quarter or year, but a miss of a certain size triggers a reporting and 
review process; this sounds more demanding on the side of the bank. Where the framework on 
the other hand involves a range, it does not specify time frame over which inflation is expected 
to return to the range. Although this omission may be viewed as a defect of the particular 
country’s regime it, however, reduces the rigor of the regime, adding a further element of 
discretion. 
 
The main goal of inflation targeting is the attainment of low level of inflation. This paves way 
for macroeconomic stability, wipe away uncertainty and promote long term contracts. Seyfried 
and Bremmer (2003) stated that the goal of inflation targeting is not on containing current 
inflation, but on intermediate and long term goal. As such, Central Banks according to Bernanke 
and Mishkin (1997) should pay close attention to indicators that have predictive power of future 
inflation.  Pui (2003) cautions that inflation targeting in its pure sense (where output and 
economic growth are given no weights) is not likely to maximize social welfare since the 
contraction or expansion of the economy does not matter so long as the inflation target is met 
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Evaluating the success of IT countries, Mishkin and Posen (1997) discovered that IT has been 
highly successful in helping countries …... to maintain low inflation rates and that there is no 
evidence that IT has produced undesirable effects on the real economy in the long run; instead it 
has likely had the effect of improving the climate for economic growth. Recent evidences have 
shown that the negative effect of high and variable inflation on macroeconomic stability, 
economic growth and income distribution largely outweigh the potential benefits derived from 
financing fiscal deficits through monetization. That it is no longer fashionable to hold onto the 
age-long growth-inflation substitution hypothesis propounded by A.W. Phillips3. Furthermore, 
Bamidele (2007) showed that most of the countries on IT framework have been able to 
simultaneously achieve a reduction in inflation as well as increase in output. 
Notwithstanding the above success stories, a number of baseline studies have investigated both 
the theoretical and empirical basis for implementing IT as a monetary policy regime from varied 
perspectives; conditions for successful implementation of IT, reasons why countries switch to IT 
regime, who sets the inflation targets, constructing and evaluating competitive empirical models, 
etc. While Masson, Savastano & Sharma (1997) for instance, argued that the requirements of IT 
in most developing countries are absent due to seigniorage or due to lack of consensus on 
attaining low inflation as a primary objective; due to lack of powerful models which could 
enable successful inflation forecast according to Kadioglu, Ozdemir & Yilmaz (2000); or 
because of relatively weak central banks’ accountability and high financial sector instability 
caused by flexible exchange rate according to Morande and Schmidt-Herbel (1999) and Mishkin 
(2000). However, this concern was examined critically by Reyes (2004) and his conclusion was 
that several studies have shown that over the past five to ten years the pass-through effect from 
currency depreciation into inflation has been decreasing in emerging economies that adopted 
inflation targeting during the mid and late nineties. 
                                                           
3
 According to Sterne (2004) the growth-inflation substitution hypothesis has not prevailed on the average for the 
countries that have adopted inflation targeting. For example, in the U.K, inflation reduced from 3.7 percent in pre-
inflation targeting regime to 2.2 percent during the inflation targeting period while the real GDP recorded a growth 
from 1.2 percent to 1.4 percent. In New Zealand, in the same period, there was a reduction in inflation from 7.5 
percent to 2.7 percent while GDP grew from 0.2 percent to 2.4 percent. 
7 
 
Since the main focus of the paper is on the assessment of applicability of IT in Nigeria, more 
attention is devoted to review of literature in the area4. Studies on appraisal of conditions for 
adoption of IT in a number of countries reveal mixed outcomes. Although these studies were 
undertaken at various stages; for some countries it was before IT was implemented, and while for 
other, well after years of its implementation. A review of them, therefore, will provide some 
insights into the practical requirements, in terms of which set of particular variables matter for a 
successful implementation of the framework in Nigeria. The following is a review of some of 
them:  
 
In South Africa, for instance, Jonsson (1999) examines the implications and relative merits and 
demerits of IT and concludes that although the country has satisfied the main prerequisites of 
inflation targeting; independence of central bank, none reliance to macroeconomic objectives 
which might be in conflict with low inflation, and relatively developed capital and money 
markets. However, what is needed is a refinement of the inflation forecasting framework and 
further experience with the operational aspects of the IT. Afterwards Woglom (2000) provides 
empirical evidences using VAR specifications that South Africa is a good candidate for inflation 
targeting. He further adds that the regime of flexible exchange rate which prevailed in South 
Africa provides automatic stabilization of IS shocks 
 
Hazirolan (1999) assesses the applicability of the inflation targeting regime in the Turkish 
economy and gives a proposal for its implementation. However, Tutar (2002) discovers that 
disinflation should be Turkey’s major priority. Her findings suggest that inflation seems to have 
a very strong inertial nature that might be caused by high expectation, relative price adjustments 
or institutional arrangements and direct linkage between monetary policy instruments and 
inflation do not appear to be strong, stable and predictable. 
 
Using a VAR model, Gottschalk and Moore (2001) assessed the link between monetary policy 
instruments and inflation in Poland. Their result showed that although exchange rate was found 
to be effective with respect to output and prices, direct linkage between interest rate and inflation 
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do not appear to be very strong. Christofferson, Solk & Wescott (2001) found that Poland is 
ready for IT. Others include: Jacobson et al. (2001) investigated the empirical basis for inflation 
targeting in Sweden using a VAR framework; Thenuwara (1998) evaluates the feasibility of 
inflation targeting in Sri Lanka by exploring the causal relationships associated with the 
monetary transmission mechanisms; Hoffmaiser (1999) uses the VAR model to calculate 
impulse responses to exogenous monetary policy in North Korea and Soikkeli (2002) assesses 
the institutional and technical design of IT framework in Norway, etc. 
Recently, Bakradze and Billmeier (2007) examined the applicability of inflation targeting regime 
in Georgia using a baseline VAR model. Their finding was that Georgia is not yet ready to 
successfully implement IT because the National Bank of Georgia (NBG) suffers from some 
institutional weaknesses - e.g., a multiplicity of potentially conflicting goals - and de facto 
implementation sometimes falls short of the de jure institutional environment. Moreover, 
monetary policymaking in Georgia is hampered by the lack of a reliable indicator of the 
monetary stance - a short-term interest rate while monetary transmission mechanism highlights 
the importance of the exchange rate channel of transmission of monetary policy. 
 
Bulir, et al (2008) using three key IT communication tools - inflation targets, inflation forecasts, 
and verbal assessments of inflation factors contained in quarterly inflation reports—provided a 
consistent message in five out of six countries; Chile, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Thailand, and Sweden. However, no single central bank, according to them, in the sample stands 
out as an exceptionally good forecaster of inflation and communicator of its policies. 
 
Conceptually, IT describes a monetary policy framework in which central banks accept and 
announce certain targets of inflation, over a given period of time, as a measure of policy anchor 
and are accountable for deviations of actual from set targets. Three main forms of inflation 
targeting have been identified: (i) Full Fledge IT (FFIT), that is, when a country is ready to adopt 
IT as its single nominal anchor upon which macroeconomic stability would be achieved. This is 
suitable for countries with a robust or sound financial environment, and a central bank, which is 
transparent, accountable and highly committed to the attainment of the goals of IT. (ii) Eclectic 
IT (EIT) when a country, for instance, pursues IT along with other monetary policy objectives in 
a stable financial environment which, however, is less accountable and transparent. (iii) Inflation 
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Targeting Lite (ITL): Low profile form of IT pursued by countries, largely due to lack of strong 
or credible macroeconomic environment. ITL countries float their exchange rate and announce 
an inflation target, but are not able to maintain the inflation target as the foremost policy 
objective. Stone (2003) classified 19 emerging market countries as practitioners of ITL. Angeriz 
and Arestis (2007) argue that FFIT is not possible in ITL countries because: (a) Lack of a 
sufficiently strong fiscal position and high debt/GDP ratio. (b) Lack of a fully developed 
monetary and financial system. (c) Vulnerability to economic shocks (especially supply shocks) 
owing to their low degree of development. (d) Lack of transparency in the operation and 
implementation of monetary policy. 
By extension and from the review factor militating against successful launching of FFTL are in 
other words necessary its take up. Myriad of these factors have been identified above. Here is a 
checklist of some of them. 
i) Central bank independence 
ii) Transparency and accountability 
iii) Sufficiently virile financial markets in terms of both depth and breadth  
iv) Single and well-defined inflation target  
v) Robust econometric model for forecasting inflation   
vi) Existence of stable and predictable relationship between monetary policy 
instruments and inflation.  
vii) Absence of fiscal dominance  
viii) Absence of multiple policy objectives 
ix) Institutional considerations  
x) Minimal burden on Central Bank financing of government deficit 
 
III. Central Bank Independence, Transparency and Accountability  
One feature of an effective central bank is independence5; these include clear and precise 
mandate; authority and ability to take effective action to achieve its key objectives and effective 
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mechanism to hold the central bank to account. In terms of clear and precise mandate, the 2007 
CBN Act stated that one of the mandates of the Bank is that of achieving price stability. To 
achieve that the Bank has instrument autonomy and does not need to consult anybody or 
organization in the choice and use of its policy instruments for monetary management. Similarly, 
the Bank has financial autonomy and does not rely on the treasury for its operational expenses. 
In fact the 2007 Act vested the power to approve the budget of the Bank in the Board of 
Directors. To ensure the independence of the Bank the Governor can only be removed by the 
President provided that the removal shall be supported by two-thirds majority of the Senate 
praying that he be so removed. 
  
The day-to-day activities of the CBN are quite transparent and truly accountable as enshrined the 
CBN Act. Information about the bank’s activities is available on a daily basis on the bank’s 
website. Besides, a wide range of monetary and financial data is published at regular intervals. 
Specifically, Section 35 of the 2007 CBN Act states: “The Bank shall make public, at all times, 
its monetary policy rate”. The Bank has, in addition, powers to hold external reserves, conduct 
treasury operations, regulate credits in the economy and manage liquidity, all in pursuance of the 
core mandate of the Bank. A committee which is strategic in this regard is the monetary policy 
committee (MPC). It communicates its decisions to the public immediately after its meeting 
which whole bi-monthly. Section 12 Sub-sections (1) states the composition of the committee as 
follows: 
 
“In order to facilitate the attainment of price stability and to support the economic policy of the 
Federal Government, there shall be a Committee of the Bank known as the Monetary Policy 
Committee (in this Act referred to as “the MPC”) which shall consist of: a) the Governor of the 
Bank who shall be the Chairman b) the four Deputy Governors of the Bank c) two members of 
the Board of Directors of the Bank d) three members appointed by the President e) two members 
appointed by the Governor”  
 
The conduct of Monetary Policy in Nigeria and all activities of the Central Bank of Nigeria relate 
with the core mandate of the bank as an apex institution. Therefore, in pursuance of its functions 
and in compliance its core mandate, the CBN undertakes monetary policy in order to:  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
strengthening society’s resolve to develop institutional arrangements that deliver low inflation. The UK experience 
from 1992 to 1997 demonstrated that – even without independence – inflation targeting could be a marked 
improvement on previous policy regimes, and this may have helped to encourage the decision to make the Bank of 
England independent in 1997. 
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 Maintain Nigeria’s external reserves to safeguard the international value of the legal currency. 
  Promote and maintenance of monetary stability and a sound and efficient financial system in 
Nigeria.  
 Act as banker and financial adviser to the Federal Government; and 
  Act as lender of last resort to banks.  
 
Important to the attainment of a sound monetary policy is the identification of a reliable 
monetary transmission mechanism6, which best evokes monetary actions into desired target. 
Over the conduct of monetary policy in Nigeria has undergone significant changes. From the use 
of direct instruments of monetary controls during the pre-adjustment period up to 1986 to a shift 
towards an indirect approach anchored on the use of market based instruments in monetary 
management. The desire is to wipe away distortions and inefficiencies that had bedeviled the 
financial system caused by long years of use of administrative instruments of control. The aim is 
also to engender competition among the operators in the financial system and the entire 
economy. 
Table 1 presents some monetary policy aggregates in the Nigerian economy between 1999 and 
2007. For those variables that go in the same direction, high growth rate of M2 prompts high 
monetization of the economy and this causes high inflation. Impressively, however, inflation 
turned out to be in a single digit in 2006 and 2007 and this is a good outcome for IT. Exchange 
rate on the other hand depreciates, though not persistently.    
Table 1:  Monetary Policy Outcomes, 1999 – 2007 
Aggregate 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
M2 Money Growth 32.5 21.3 17.7 19.4 25.0 12.3 16.6 30.6 30.9 
CPI Inflation 6.6 6.9 18.9 12.9 23.8 10.0 11.6 8.5 6.6 
Fiscal Balance 29.7 15.5 21.7 18.8 15.4 11.5 8.4 4.9 4.8 
Exchange Rate 29.7 102.1 111.9 121.0 129.4 133.5 132.1 128.7 125.8 
 
         
Memorandum Items          
Real GDP growth 3.0 3.8 4.7 4.6 9.6 6.6 6.5 6.0 6.2 
Monetization (M2/GDP) 21.9 22.8 28.1 29.6 28.6 19.8 18.0 19.8 25.5 
Credit to the Economy/GDP 19.8 10.4 18.1 16.7 17.8 17.3 15.5 4.14 11.3 
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thorough discussion of the various channels in the Armenian and Georgian context respectively. It also draws from 
an ongoing study by Research Department of Central Bank of Nigeria on Monetary Transmission Mechanism. 
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Source: Obtained from Statistical Bulletin and Annual Reports and Statement of Accounts of Central Bank of 
Nigeria, various issues. 
 
Fiscal profile of the government declines almost throughout with no serious threat of dominance. 
Rate of real GDP growth revealed an impressive performance in 2003 and remained stable at 
around 6 percent afterwards. The ratio of credit to the economy to GDP is moderate. Notice that 
the above tends revealed only a casual relationship in and between the aggregates. Any definite 
cause and effect interaction could be best obtained by recourse to more serious econometric 
analysis. We present the research methodology of the study in the next section.  
IV. Methodology of the Paper 
In this section, we examine one major empirical precondition7 of inflation targeting regime 
mentioned above; trying to build a solid understanding of the relationship between monetary 
policy instruments and inflation rate measured in terms of consumer price index. To achieve the 
above and in line with the methodology employed by Gottschalk and Moore (2001), Tutar 
(2002) and, more recently, by Bakradze and Billmeier (2007), this paper adopts vector 
autoregression (VAR) methodology and the Granger causality tests in both bivariate and 
multivariate forms. The VAR methodology is commonly used for forecasting systems of 
interrelated time series and for analyzing the dynamic impact of random disturbances on the 
system of variables.  
The general mathematical representation of a VAR is:  
     Xt = A(L)Xt – 1 +  B(L)Zt + εt        (1) 
Equation (1) is saying that Xt is a k vector of endogenous variable, Zt is a d vector of exogenous 
variables, A and B are matrices of reduced-form coefficients to be estimated, and εt is a vector of 
innovations, impulses or shocks. We estimate the reduced-form VAR and identified monetary 
policy shocks through the liquidity, interest rate and exchange rate channels. The endogenous 
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low inflation. These in turn can help to build a constituency for low inflation that involved a virtuous circle of 
reducing inflation expectations and strengthening society’s confidence in its monetary institutions. 
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variables in the model consists of the gross domestic product (yt), consumer price index (cpi), 
domestic money supply (dms), fiscal spending (fs), interest rate (ir) and exchange rate (er) 
  Xt  =  (yt, cpi, dms, fs, ir, er)’     (2) 
The ordering of the variables follows the lower diagonal value of a correlation matrix and the 
degree of endogeneity to current economic conditions and in line with the Cholesky ordering 
criteria. We use data at quarterly frequency from 1986Q1 t0 2007Q4 obtained from the 
publications of Central Bank of Nigeria and international financial statistics (IFS) from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The VAR has 5 lags - in line with the information provided 
by the lag section criteria, no constant or time trend and uses logarithm for all variables except 
interest rate where we have used the level. We run the VAR in levels in line with the Bayesian 
methodology, which according to Mountford (2005) the methodology is robust to the presence of 
non-stationarity and though it does not impose any cointegrating long run relationships between 
the variables, it does not preclude their existence either.  
V. Empirical Analysis 
One of the main prerequisite for a successful adoption of inflation targeting framework as 
expounded in many empirical studies is the existence of a stable and predictable relationship 
between monetary policy instruments and inflation. In this section we present the empirical 
results of our VAR model, which contains six endogenous variables as specified in equation (2). 
Meanwhile, as a preliminary analysis, the Granger causality tests on some select channels of 
monetary transmission are presented as follows. 
Table 2 presents the results of the bivariate and multivariate block Granger causality tests for 
price (cpi) and output (yt) in Nigeria. The test tests whether an endogenous variable can be 
treated as exogenous for each equation in the VAR. Overall, the results suggest the joint 
significance of the policy variables on cpi and yt. The joint probabilities for the multivariate tests 
suggest the rejection of the null hypothesis. The bivariate tests for cpi suggest that all the 
variables except interest rate cause significant variations in cpi. This is consistent with the 
expectations; that is, the level of output, money supply, exchange rate and fiscal spending cause 
variations in the level of prices or the cpi. 
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The results further show that two key monetary policy variables; interest rate and money supply, 
significantly drive output. Government’s fiscal spending too, significantly drives output. 
However, exchange rate and prices are insignificant. The findings support one of the main policy 
thrust of monetary policy in Nigeria of achieving of price stability and economic growth via 
monetary policy. 
 
 Table 2: Granger Causality Tests: Baseline VAR, 1999–2006 1/  
Effect on price (cpi) Chi-square Probability 
yt 7.23 0.124* 
Dms 8.69 0.069* 
Er 8.38 0.079* 
Fs 7.60 0.108* 
Ir 4.50 0.342 
Joint 34.56 0.023* 
Effect on Output (yt)   
Dms 5.6 0.231** 
Cpi 2.97 0.562 
Er 4.72 0.317 
Fs 7.66 0.105* 
Ir 24.92 0.000* 
Joint 49.93 0.000* 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
1/ The block Granger causality test for exclusion of a variable is based on a Wald test and follows 
a χ² distribution; * and ** denote rejection of the exclusion at the 1 and 5 percent level. 
 
An intuitive way to interpret the relationship between monetary policy instruments and cpi using 
VAR is to compute an impulse response function (IFR). An impulse response function traces the 
effect of a one-time shock to one of the innovations on current and future values of the 
endogenous variables. In our analysis, for instance, if there is a strong and predictable 
relationship between the monetary policy instruments and future cpi, then it can be said that the 
lagged changes in the monetary policy instruments are economically important in explaining 
future cpi. Throughout, we use a period of 12 quarters ahead in the analysis of impulse response 
function and the variance decompositions and 95 percent confidence interval, is represented by 
the dotted lines.  
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In figure 1 below, the quarterly impulse response functions indicate how the monetary policy and 
other related variables affect cpi. In other words, it shows how cpi responds to innovations or 
shocks in the other endogenous variables as specified in the VAR equation 2. The response of 
cpi to its own shocks is contemporaneously very strong and also in the quarter following the 
shock and throughout the short and medium term horizons at an average of 4-5 percent, but, less 
persistent afterwards. Also, a one-standard deviation shock to domestic money supply results in 
an increase in cpi of about 2.1 percent in the quarter following the shock and remains significant 
in the fourth quarter. This is despite the initial undershooting in the first and third quarter. The 
response stabilizes at an average of a little above 2 percent in the medium and long term 
horizons. The response of money supply8 on the other hand, to innovations in cpi is, however, 
negative at close to 2 percent in the medium term and an average of 2.6 percent in the long term 
horizon. By way of summing up, while expansionary monetary policy, which works through the 
liquidity channel, positively affects prices in the economy, inflationary pressure is usually 
followed by contractionary monetary measures in the economy. 
 
The response of cpi to positive innovations in output is, however, counterintuitive, though very 
strong at average of 3.5 percent in the short and medium term horizons and subsequently up to 
5.9 percent somewhere in the long term. This implies that increase in productivity rather than 
leads to a decline in prices generate more inflationary pressure in the economy. More consistent 
is the response of output to shocks in cpi, which in line with theoretical postulations, shows an 
inverse link – see appendix for more results.  
 
                                                           
8
 See the appendix for a full set of impulse responses results 
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Furthermore, consistent with theory is the response of cpi to innovations in exchange rate, which 
is very strong, especially in the medium term, it stood at an average of 4 percent. This implies 
that persistent exchange rate depreciation causes inflation9. This finding could be expected 
because of the reliance of the economy on imported food and other items. This strongly 
corroborates the above findings in table 2 and hence a pointer to the strength of the exchange rate 
channel as a means of checking inflation. While a number of studies10 show that a flexible 
                                                           
9
 The exchange rate-cpi link suggests the effect of exchange rate pass-through, that is, the degree by which exchange 
rate depreciation translate into inflation in the economy. 
10
 See Bernanke et al. (1999), Mishkin and Savastano (2002) and De Gregorio, Tokman and Valdes (2005). Edward 
(2006) analyze three key issues in his study: i) the effectiveness of nominal exchange rates as shock absorbers in 
countries with inflation targeting, which is closely related to the magnitude of the "pass-through" coefficient. ii) 
17 
 
exchange rate regime is consistent with the inflation targeting framework, others, however, show 
that this could generate more instability when the exchange rate is allowed to float11.  
 
The response of cpi to fiscal spending is consistent, less severe – at less than 1 percent on the 
average, and is less persistent over the time horizons. This is contrary to the results in table 2. 
Finally, the response of cpi to interest rate – 3 months deposit rate, is generally weak, 
counterintuitive and less persistent. So is also the response of interest to price shocks. This 
supports the result of Granger causality test reported in table 2 and as well suggests that interest 
rate channel of monetary transmission is weak. 
 
Variance decomposition results presented in table 3 corroborate the above empirical findings 
from the impulse responses. The 12 period forecast (3 years) show that, put together, the 
variances of output, money supply, exchange rate fiscal spending and interest rate account for 
less that 50 percent of variability in cpi. In other words, innovations to these endogenous 
variables explain less 50 percent variation in the level of consumer price index in the short and 
medium term horizons. This implies that the price behavior is characterized by inertial nature or 
is apathetical within these time horizons. Therefore, a policy change in either money supply or 
interest rate is unlikely to bring desired change in price as the two accounted for less than 15 
percent (jointly) in the short and medium term. In the long term, however, the trend gradually 
changes, cpi accounts for less than 45 percent of its variance while output and exchange rate 
gained more prominence. This further underscores the need for an increase in productivity and 
importance of the exchange rate channel in checking inflation in the economy.  
The variance decomposition of output follows suit as it also chiefly drives its own variance in the 
first quarter. The variance of interest rate forcefully took over in the medium term, accounting 
for over ½ of output variability and over ⅓ in the long term horizon. This truly reflect our 
discovery in table 2 where the latter strongly Granger cause the former.    
                                                                                                                                                                                           
whether exchange rate volatility is different in countries with an inflation targeting regime than in countries with 
alternative monetary policy arrangements. iii) whether the exchange rate should play a role in determining the 
monetary policy stance under inflation targeting.  
11
 This connection between inflation targeting and floating exchange rates has led some analysts to argue that one of 
the costs of IT is the increase in exchange rate volatility. However, recent study by Edward (2007) argues that there 
is no need for the authorities to abstain completely from intervention in the foreign exchange market. 
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Table 3: Variance Decomposition: VAR, 1986Q1–2006Q4 
(In percent of total variance) 
Variance Decomposition of CPI:         
Period S.E. YT DMS CPI ER FS IR 
1 0.040689 2.271086 3.373526 94.35539 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
2 0.064954 5.849749 4.436332 86.67507 2.103144 0.917074 0.018636 
3 0.085957 11.78645 4.043581 77.49763 4.39067 1.133573 1.148097 
4 0.111246 12.64488 6.350427 68.40082 10.55253 1.095392 0.955951 
5 0.130773 13.3771 8.448556 62.56622 13.47103 0.961304 1.175791 
6 0.147241 14.59483 8.822429 58.12611 16.12265 0.858693 1.475293 
7 0.162316 14.54152 8.566143 57.21748 16.64349 1.567233 1.46413 
8 0.175295 16.0195 9.607804 52.88541 17.55521 1.45628 2.475797 
9 0.187228 18.12044 10.95031 48.99512 18.18612 1.414214 2.33379 
10 0.197142 19.82575 10.80463 47.14089 18.07911 1.865403 2.284218 
11 0.206331 22.87934 10.50636 43.77798 18.40055 1.870787 2.564985 
12 0.215415 24.39233 10.93614 42.27761 17.78639 1.971502 2.636035 
 Variance Decomposition of YT:         
Period S.E. YT DMS CPI ER FS IR 
1 0.048745 100 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
2 0.060003 85.48264 0.28409 1.10365 0.007869 0.08432 13.03743 
3 0.069554 69.08072 0.307109 0.762887 0.004502 0.05994 29.78485 
4 0.079308 53.50970 1.589696 0.462939 0.491839 0.121089 43.82474 
5 0.09543 41.74796 2.272447 0.591329 0.930217 0.203024 54.25502 
6 0.105018 35.05878 3.474235 1.366036 2.96312 0.641015 56.49681 
7 0.115789 31.03246 5.267123 1.900086 6.81929 1.365692 53.61535 
8 0.12747 28.88327 6.951155 2.3792 10.58112 2.12932 49.07594 
9 0.139757 28.15783 8.350472 2.796563 13.42415 3.326445 43.94454 
10 0.151549 28.49554 9.53839 3.186676 14.5649 4.513205 39.70129 
11 0.163469 29.67405 10.45181 3.561651 14.37312 5.614539 36.32482 
12 0.174479 31.36517 10.95398 3.848665 13.47403 6.65031 33.70784 
 Cholesky Ordering: YT DMS CPI ER 
FS IR         
 
Other variance decompositions12 of the variables in the VAR model show that money supply 
drives its own variance in the short term, but, subsequently by variances of output and fiscal 
                                                           
12
 See the appendix for a full set of variance decomposition results 
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spending. Exchange rate also shapes its own variance in the short term and then by the variance 
of government’s fiscal spending. Earlier, the decomposition of the variance of output shows that 
the nexus between fiscal spending and output is very weak - the variance of the latter accounts 
for less than one-tenth of variations in the former throughout the three time horizons; short, 
medium and long term, this in a feedback effect is confirmed from the decomposition of the 
variance of fiscal spending. However, contrary expectations and to what in reality obtains, the 
variance of interest rate accounts for over 60 percent (almost two-third of variation in fiscal 
spending) in the medium term and more than 50 percent (over one-half of variation in fiscal 
spending) in the long term.  Lastly, in line with our earlier findings, the variance of output drives 
about one-third of variability in the level of interest rate 
 
The nexus between monetary policy instruments and cpi is further explored using additional 
endogenous variables by the authors. These include; treasury bills rate, lending rate and ratio of 
credit to money supply. A four-variable VAR is estimated using lag 1 and 2 as suggested by the 
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lag selection criteria and the ordering of the variables also follows the Cholesky criteria. Figure 2 
presents the impulse responses of only cpi to innovations in other endogenous variables in the 
model. Again, the response of cpi to its own shocks, except for the initial overshooting is very 
strong in the quarter following the shock and throughout the short and medium term horizons. 
The response of cpi to innovations in the other three variables is, however, insignificant even 
though is theoretically consistent. The ratio of credit to lagged M2, for instance, deflates cpi in 
the quarter following the shock by only a-half of a percent. This remains very low in the medium 
term and a little above 1 percent in the long term horizon. The response of cpi to innovations in 
the Treasury Bills rate (tbr) is consistent only within the short term horizon although it is highly 
marginal also. Counter intuitively, the effect in the medium and long term horizons became 
positive and remained very low throughout. Lending rate’s innovations exert negative effect on 
cpi as expected but also very insignificant. It was 1 percent in the quarter following the shock 
and less than half of a percent throughout. 
Table 4: Variance Decomposition: VAR, 1986Q1–2006Q4 
(In percent of total variance) 
Variance Decompositions of CPI     
Period S.E. CPI CMS TBR LR 
1 0.184575 100 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
2 0.205207 99.18363 0.075026 0.427554 0.313793 
3 0.239953 99.17586 0.240278 0.335178 0.248682 
4 0.25971 99.22057 0.232488 0.299612 0.247331 
5 0.279675 99.19027 0.333436 0.258792 0.217504 
6 0.295027 99.20980 0.358532 0.232560 0.199105 
7 0.309013 99.15558 0.450295 0.212184 0.181943 
8 0.320776 99.12210 0.511277 0.197353 0.169269 
9 0.331298 99.05235 0.603438 0.185408 0.158801 
10 0.340474 98.99097 0.682645 0.175850 0.150531 
11 0.348694 98.91462 0.773971 0.167742 0.143669 
12 0.356001 98.84226 0.858722 0.160928 0.138089 
 Cholesky Ordering: CPI CMS TBR LR     
 
Variance decompositions presented in table 4 attest the above findings. The results show that cpi 
uniquely drives its own variance in the short, medium and long term horizons. This unveils the 
fact that the level of prices or cpi in the model is an inertial phenomena; meaning predictions 
about cpi could best be obtained within the cpi itself. Over 99 percent of the variance of cpi is 
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explained by the itself in throughout the horizons. This implies that past information on the level 
of cpi is very critical in the determination of future level of cpi. 
 
VI. Conclusions and Recommendations   
This paper seeks to explore the applicability of IT in the Nigerian economy based on historical 
data from 1986 to 2006. Although the three key conditions for IT have been identified in the 
literature; this paper examines only one, which is the existence of a predictable relationship 
between monetary policy instruments and inflation (the others being CBN autonomy and 
transparency and accountability). The authors employed Granger causality tests and an 
unrestricted VAR methodology with five variables in a 4 lag specification. 
The bivariate and multivariate Granger causality tests show that the level of output, money 
supply, exchange rate and fiscal spending in the economy cause variations in the level of prices 
or the cpi while interest rate does not. Output variations were found to be significantly caused by 
interest rate, money supply and the level of fiscal spending, while the roles of exchange rate and 
prices were quite insignificant.  
 
The impulse response functions from the VAR model show that the response of cpi to its own 
shocks is contemporaneously very strong and remain so throughout the short and medium term 
horizons, but, less persistent afterwards. The response of cpi to innovations in money supply 
(liquidity channel) and interest rate (interest rate channel) were found to be less significant. This 
was reinforced by results from variance decomposition of the cpi where the latter two accounted 
for less than 15 percent of the variance of the former in both the short and medium term. Similar 
results were obtained when additional variables – monetary indicators, such as ratio of credit to 
money supply, treasury bills rate and 3-months lending rate, were used. Interest rate, however, 
was found to be a strong driver of productivity in the economy. Although these findings do not 
suggest total ineffectiveness of the monetary channels, it however raise doubt when the monetary 
authority solely rely on them as instruments for achieving effective inflation targeting regime.  
 
On the other hand, the nexus between cpi and exchange rate and cpi and productivity were found 
to be robust in the long term although the latter is counterintuitive. Real sector productivity is 
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paramount in any fight against inflation. Also, the significance of the exchange rate channel 
given by the inverse link between cpi and exchange rate suggest the effect of exchange rate-pass 
through on the level of prices in the economy. Productivity along with exchange rate accounted 
for significant percentage of the variance of cpi in both the medium and long term.  The results 
further show no threat of fiscal dominance in the sample. 
 
In view of the above findings, which in conclusion reveal no strong quantitative link between 
monetary aggregates and prices, the paper recommends that Nigeria should not  pursue full 
fledged inflation targeting rather Nigeria should adopt inflation targeting lite given the enormous 
advantage of inflation targeting as monetary policy framework. 
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